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Abstract 
This study was inspired by the observation that foreign financial service firms 
operating in the City of London do not suffer the liability of foreignness to the 
extent suggested by theory. To examine the reasons for this departure from 
theory, the study advances a theoretical framework that distinguishes between 
three types of advantages that together account for the competitive performance 
of MNEs relative to that of indigenous firms. Empirical analyses of a sample of 
296 foreign financial service firms in the City of London shows that in this 
particular context major sources of competitive performance are the firm-
specific advantages and the advantages of multinationality, where British firms 
may not necessarily possess an advantage over foreign firms. An examination of 
the validity of the findings, in order to assess the extent to which this situation is 
unique to the City of London or rather signifies a more general trend that 
requires theoretical modifications and extensions, is emphasised as a major task 
for future research.   
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Liability of Foreignness in global competition? 
Financial service MNEs in the City of London 
 
‘There is great potential to enliven current theory and to develop new insights if theorists 
search for and work with inconsistencies, contradictions, and tensions in their theories, and 
in the relationships between them’  







The theories of international business and management provide two, 
somewhat related, reasons for expecting that firms based in a 
locationally advantageous home country would outperform their 
foreign counterparts in their national markets. First, foreign firms face 
additional costs, arising from their unfamiliarity with and lack of roots 
in a foreign environment (Kindleberger 1969, Hymer 1960/1976), 
what Zaheer (1995) named the ‘liability of foreignness’ (hereafter 
LOF). A number of studies established the existence and persistence 
of the LOF in various industrial and geographical contexts (Zaheer 
1995, Zaheer and Mosakowski 1997, Miller and Parkhe 2002, Shukla 
and Inwegen 1995, Mezias 2002). These studies have illustrated the 
advantages gained by indigenous firms due to their easier access to 
local information and knowledge, and have shown the higher 
transaction and information costs incurred by foreign firms. They 
have also documented the implications of these asymmetries for the 
relative performance of foreign and indigenous firms competing in the 
same environment.   
 
The second reason for expecting national firms to be more 
competitive within their home country is proposed by the theory of 
the origin of the MNE competitive advantages. This theory suggests 
that national firms enjoy favourable access to the assets of their home 
country and use these to develop competitive advantages that are 
deprived from foreign firms investing in their country (Dunning 1979, 
Hu 1992, Nachum 1999). Thus, when a home country is locationally 
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advantageous, national firms would be the first to benefit from these 
advantages. Empirical studies have documented a close link between 
the location advantages of home countries and the type and nature of 
the competitive advantages of national firms (Whitley 1992, Kogut 
1993, Thomas and Waring 1999, McKendrick 2001).  
 
In this study I seek to examine one setting that is inconsistent with 
these theoretical arguments - financial services in the City of London. 
It appears as if nationality of ownership does not provide the benefits 
that theory predicts in this context, and foreign firms do not seem to 
suffer a liability associated with foreignness. Foreign firms are more 
profitable, grow faster and survive longer than British-owned firms 
operating in this environment (British Invisibles 2000, Augar 2001). I 
seek to identify the possible reasons for this departure from what 
theory predicts and to draw their implications for further theoretical 
development. Rather than treating the case of financial services in the 
City of London as a theoretical inconsistency and an exception to the 
rule, I attempt to use it to develop a more encompassing theory that 
takes into account this exception (Poole and Van de Ven 1989).  
 
A better understanding of the dynamics of foreign operation in the 
City of London, which have eliminated the power of the LOF, and an 
assessment of the validity of this situation beyond this specific setting, 
has important implications for the further development of the theory 
of the LOF, as part of the more general theory of the MNE. The 
assumptions that foreign activity is associated with additional costs 
arising from the unfamiliarity with the foreign environment, and the 
need for some compensation mechanisms to overcome these costs, 
have been fundamental in the development of international business 
theory since Hymer’s initial contribution. Establishing that such 
liabilities of foreignness may not exist in all circumstances, and 
identifying their causes and the conditions under which they are 
expected to be more pronounced, has important implications for the 
understanding of the nature of foreign operations, the differences 
between foreign and domestic investments, and the determinants of 
the international competitiveness of MNEs. It also has fundamental 
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bearings for the debate on the impact of nationality and the 
persistence of the home-based advantages in global competition.  
 
In the next section, I sketch briefly a picture of the dynamic 
competitive position of British- and foreign-owned firms in the City 
of London and in global competition over the last decades. The 
following section is devoted to the introduction of a theoretical 
framework that distinguishes between different types of advantages 
that together form the competitive performance of MNEs. A set of 
research hypotheses is generated to specify the expected strength and 
direction of the differences between foreign- and British-owned firms 
in relation to each of these advantages. Hypotheses are also advanced 
regarding the expected impact of a number of moderating variables on 
the link between the possession of these advantages and the LOF. 
These hypotheses are tested in the following section on a sample of 
foreign financial service firms in the City of London. The paper 
concludes by discussing the implications of the findings for firms and 
for further theoretical development. I suggest that a major task for 
future research would be to establish the validity of the findings in 
different industrial and geographical contexts. This would provide a 
basis for understanding whether this particular case represents a trend, 
and hence requires modification of existing theory (Eisenhardt 1989), 
or rather is a unique event.  
 
Foreign- and British-Owned Firms in the City of London 
 
British financial service firms dominated world markets for centuries. 
This position was related to certain location advantages of Britain that 
supported and sustained the development of strong competitive 
advantages of firms in this sector (Jones 1993). In particular, their 
strength in the 19
th and first half of the 20
th centuries rested in large 
part on the British economic and political pre-eminence, and on the 
strong position of the pound as the major world currency. They were 
the first financial service firms to establish foreign operations, and 
they held the dominant position in the then global market for decades. 
No other country matched the number of overseas operations of 
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British financial service firms (mostly banks) before the Second 
World War (Jones 1993).  
 
In the decades following the Second World War, however, British 
financial service firms lost much of their dominant position in world 
markets to firms of other nationalities. While British banks dominated 
the overwhelming majority of foreign assets controlled by 
multinational banks until the Second World War, their shares shrunk 
continuously to less than 5% in the early 1990s (Jones 1993). In 
insurance, the combined number of foreign operations owned by 
British firms in the 1960s was larger than that of its major competitors 
combined. Today their share of international business is smaller than 
that of all the major competitors in this sector (Sigma 2000). 
 
Not only has their position in international markets been continuously 
deteriorating, but British financial service firms have even lost their 
position in servicing the financial and commercial needs of firms in 
Britain to foreign firms. The literature suggests to operationalise the 
theoretical construct LOF by the comparative performance of foreign- 
and domestically-owned firms operating in the same environment 
(e.g. Zaheer 1995). Two measures commonly used are survival 
(Zaheer and Mosakowski 1997) and profitability (Zaheer 1995). 
Analysed according to these criteria, of the City firms that went out of 
business between 1975-2000, 214 were British and 99 foreign 
(Nachum 2000a)
1. The profit margins of British and foreign financial 
service firms in the City were 13.216 and 14.720 respectively 
(Nachum 2000a).  
 
Two closely related reasons are commonly cited to explain this 
decline of British-owned financial service firms: the deteriorating 
position of the British economy in the world economy, a result of the 
gradual loss of the British empire in the decades following the Second 
World War, and the related decline of the pound as the dominant 
currency of international transactions (see for example Rose 1994a, 
1994b, Michie 1991).  
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Neither of these, however, has affected the position of London as a 
global financial centre. From the 1950s onward, as Britain was losing 
its dominant economic position, London moved from being a 
financial centre based on Britain’s dominance of foreign trade and 
investment to one that functions as a world financial centre. The 
character of activity taking place in London has changed from one 
relying on the pound to one that relies on multi-currencies, and 
London developed a position as an international financial centre 
through its attraction to business in non-pound currencies. The rise of 
the Eurocurrency markets since the 1960s further encouraged the 
transformation of London into an international financial centre. 
Radical deregulatory reforms in the 1970s and 1980s - including the 
abolition of exchange controls in 1979, the Big Bang liberalisation of 
the Stock Exchange in 1986, generation of business through 
privatisation, deregulation and liberalisation of the building societies 
activities - have further increased London’s attraction to foreign 
financial service firms, and enhanced its position as an international 
financial centre. These developments have been documented in great 
detail in a large number of studies (see Cobham 1992, Budd and 
Whimster 1992, Michie 1992, London Business School 1995, Morgan 
1997, among others). London thus came to exercise a role in 
international financial markets that contrasts sharply with the poor 
economic performance of British-owned financial service firms, both 
in London and overseas (Figure 1). 
 
If London indeed possesses such considerable location advantages, as 
the sheer amounts of foreign activity concentrated in the City 
suggests
2, why are British-owned firms not the first ones to take 
advantage of them? What factors enable foreign firms to overcome 
the LOF (Zaheer 1995, Zaheer and Mosakowski 1997, Miller and 
Parkhe 2002, Mezias 2002) and outperform their local counterparts? 
Most importantly, how unique is this case and what are its 
implications beyond those related specifically to the City of London? 
Does it imply that nationality does not matter in this sector? Or in 
global competition in general? Or rather that there is some specific 
weakness of British-owned firms in their inability to take advantage 
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of their privileged access to the advantages of London as a location 
for financial services activity?  
 
In the next section, I introduce a theoretical framework that 
distinguishes between various types of advantages of MNEs, which 
are assumed to affect the strength of the LOF, and advance research 
hypotheses related to the expected impact of foreignness on them. I 
also hypothesise on the impact of a number of the moderating factors 
on the link between these advantages and the LOF.  
 
Theory and Hypotheses 
 
The theory of the MNE’s advantages implicitly or explicitly 
distinguishes between several types of advantages that together shape 
the competitiveness of MNEs. These are the firm-specific advantages 
(that arise from the possession of certain intangible capabilities); the 
multinationality advantages (the advantages associated with 
multinational activity per se); and the home-based advantages (that 
arise from the exclusive access of firms to the resources and 
conditions in their home countries). The possession and strength of 
these advantages determine the competitive position of MNEs. I argue 




Drawing on Industrial Organisation theory, Hymer (1960) was the 
first to acknowledge implicitly the need for some proprietary 
advantages as a necessary condition for foreign activities. These 
advantages are based on the possession and use of certain intangible 
assets, such as patents, trademarks, management skills etc., which 
enable the firm to reach high levels of technical or price efficiency 
(Caves 1996). These intangible advantages of MNEs are the 
mechanisms that foreign firms use to compensate for the lack of 
access to local resources and for the additional costs associated with 
doing business abroad. They are mobile geographically and are 
transferred internally within the MNE across national borders. Hymer 
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was explicit in acknowledging that these are the areas in which 
foreign firms have advantages that are superior to those of local firms, 
and these enable them to compete successfully in foreign countries. 
Formally:   
H1a: Foreign firms outperform British-owned firms in the firm-
specific advantages, and these advantages eliminate the LOF. 
 
Advantages of multinationality 
Dunning accepted the need for the firm-specific advantages, of the 
Industrial Organisation tradition, and added to these the advantages 
that arise from multinationality per se (see Dunning 1993 for a 
comprehensive summary). While the former are required for the 
competitive success of any firm, regardless of the geographic scope of 
its activity, the latter are confined to multinational firms, and arise 
directly from the ability to benefit from the cross-border dimension of 
activities undertaken under common governance. They are associated 
with the coordination of multiple and geographically dispersed value-
added activities, the ability to access resources in different locations, 
obtain information from multiple environments, spread risk, and 
benefit from economies of scale and scope arising from large scale 
production. Foreign firms investing in the City, all of whom are by 
definition part of international networks, possess more of these 
advantages than their British-owned counterparts, some of whom only 
operate locally. Formally: 
H1b: Foreign firms outperform British-owned firms in 





The theory of the MNE advantages states that in addition to the 
competitive advantages that distinguish individual firms from their 
national and foreign competitors, MNEs also possess advantages that 
arise from their favourable access to the resources of their home 
countries (Dunning 1979, Hu 1992, Nachum 1999). For example, 
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countries with a highly skilled labour force will facilitate the 
development of technological capabilities of national firms; those with 
abundant supply of cheap labour will encourage the development of 
advantages related to labour intensity. The bundle of competitive 
advantages of an MNE thus consists of competitive advantages that are 
partly shaped by the resources of the home country and those resulting 
from the strategic behaviour of firms, which may not be directly related 
to the characteristics of their home countries.  
 
Hymer is explicit in emphasising that national firms enjoy favourable 
access to the resources of their home countries, arising from 
reasonable and unreasonable preferences by employees and investors 
towards their own country firms. More recent research has shown that 
foreign firms are in a considerable disadvantage here and that their 
ability to build their competitive advantages by accessing assets 
abundant in other countries via foreign investment is limited (Nachum 
2000, Thomas and Waring 1999). Hence, we can expect national 
firms to possess more of the advantages that arise from the utilisation 
of the resources of their home countries.  
 
The case for expecting the home-based advantages to give firms 
superior advantages over foreign firms is particularly strong when the 
country concerned is locationally advantageous in comparison with 
the home countries of the investing firms. The advantageous 
locational assets provide national firms a strong basis for competitive 
advantages that foreign firms do not have. Given the considerable 
location advantages of London vis-à-vis the majority of the home 
countries of the firms investing in London, we can expect British-
owned firms to outperform foreign firms in London in the home-
based advantages. Formally:     
H1c: British-owned firms outperform foreign firms in the home-
based advantages, and these advantages strengthen the LOF. 
   
The relative importance of the various advantages 
The non-existence of the LOF in the City of London may suggest that 
in this particular context, the firm-specific advantages and the 
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advantages of multinationality are more important for competitive 
success than those arising from access to the home-based advantages. 
Hence, the advantages provided to British firms from their favourable 
access to the latter cannot compensate for the superior advantages of 
MNEs in terms of the firm-specific advantages and advantages of 
multinationality
3. Formally: 
H1d: The firm-specific advantages and the advantages of 
multinationality possess more explanatory power for the relative 






The literature on the LOF acknowledges a number of moderating 
variables that are likely to affect the strength of the LOF. Using the 
distinction between the different types of advantages introduced 
above, I link these moderating variables with specific elements of 
competitive advantages on which they may have impact.  
 
Duration of foreign operation  
There appears to be two different reasons for the LOF to weaken over 
time as a function of the duration of foreign operation. First, some of 
the additional costs associated with foreign operation tend to diminish 
over time. Hymer (1960/1976) distinguished between two types of 
costs incurred by firms investing in foreign countries: the costs of 
acquiring information on foreign markets, and those incurred as a 
result of discriminatory policies of local governments, consumers and 
suppliers. While the latter may not change over time, the former are 
likely to diminish, as firms become more familiar with the foreign 
environment. Over time, foreign firms are likely to get easier access 
to the resources of the host country and develop their competitive 
advantages based on them, in a manner similar to local firms. A 
number of empirical studies have confirmed these theoretical 
arguments and have shown that the differences between foreign and 
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domestically-owned firms tend to diminish over time (Mezias 2002, 
Zaheer and Mosakowski 1997, Tschoegl 1987).  
 
The second reason for expecting the LOF to weaken over time is that 
the superior firm-specific advantages of MNEs lose some of their 
superiority via spillovers and imitations or appropriation by local 
competitors (Zaheer and Mosakowski 1997). Hymer referred to the 
diffusion of firms’ advantages over time via demonstration effects 
that induce local firms to follow the example of foreign firms and 
imitate their operating routines and technologies. Formally:  
H2a: Length of operation weakens the LOF by enabling foreign 
firms easier access to the host country resources.  
H2b: Length of operation weakens the LOF via its impact on the 
dissipation of the firm-specific advantages. 
 
Cultural Distance Between the Host and Home Countries 
 
The greater the differences in political, legal, socio-cultural and 
economic institutions between the home and host countries, the 
greater the disadvantages that foreign firms are likely to have via-a-
vis local ones (Miller 2001, Miller and Parkhe 2002). Cultural 
distance increases both the difficulty of understanding and 
interpreting local requirements, and the extent of the adjustments 
required in order to compete successfully in foreign environments 
(Kostova and Zaheer 1999).  
Such impact is likely to be exercised in two ways. First, by 
eliminating the ability of an MNE to effectively transfer the firm-
specific advantages to the affiliates. Studies have shown that the 
cultural distance between the home and host countries is negatively 
related to the transfer of the parent’s practices to the affiliates 
(Rosenzweig and Noharia 1994) and to the intensity of the linkages 
between them (Rosezweig and Singh (1991). 
 
Second, cultural distance is also likely to reduce the ability of a 
foreign entrant to access host country resources and to build its 
advantages based on them. In support of this, Zeile (1998) found that 
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the use of domestic content by foreign affiliates in the US is related 
negatively to the cultural and institutional distance between their 
home countries and the US. Zeile suggests that cultural distance 
between the home and the host countries may very well constitute a 
barrier that makes it more costly for the affiliates to contract with US 
suppliers for their immediate inputs. Formally: 
H3a: The greater the cultural distance between the host and home 
countries, the stronger the LOF, due to difficulties associated with 
the transfer of the firm-specific advantages. 
H3b: The greater the cultural distance between the host and 
home countries, the stronger the LOF, due to difficulties 






Entry mode, whether via greenfield or M&As, is likely to affect the 
LOF in two different directions. On the one hand, there is far weaker 
basis for expecting MNEs to experience the LOF when they enter 
foreign markets via the acquisition of a previously independent local 
firm. Such an entry mode is likely to eliminate the difficulties of 
accessing host country resources and building competitive advantages 
based on them. The disadvantages arising from lack of knowledge of 
the foreign environment are weaker, as MNEs are able to draw upon 
the knowledge of the acquired firm. Also difficulties associated with 
discrimination of various kinds are usually weaker, when the acquired 
firm has previously enjoyed a status of a local firm. An affiliate 
established via M&A is likely to gain legitimacy and appear less 
foreign (Kostova and Zaheer 1999) than one founded de novo.  
 
At the same time, however, entry via M&As is likely to impede the 
transfer of the firm-specific advantages to the foreign affiliates 
(Rosenzweig and Singh 1991, Rosenzweig and Noharia 1994), acting 
to strengthen the LOF. When affiliates are founded as greenfield 
investments the MNE usually seeks to replicate key features of the 
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parent company, and shapes the new establishments to reflect its own 
capabilities. By contrast, affiliates established via acquisition are 
likely to maintain their identity and norms of operations that they had 
developed independently before the acquisition.  Hence, there are 
usually more intense linkages and transfers between parent and 
greenfield establishments than between parents and acquired firms 
(Rosenzweig and Singh 1991, Rosenzweig and Noharia 1994). 
Formally:   
H4a: Entry via M&As weakens the LOF by easing the access of 
foreign affiliates to the host country resources 
H4b: Entry via M&As strengthens the LOF by impeding the 




The organisational structure, notably the level of autonomy of the 
affiliates and the extent of their integration within the MNE of which 
they are part, are likely to affect the LOF in two different ways. 
Greater autonomy of affiliates may act to strengthen the LOF as this is 
likely to be associated with less transfer of compensating mechanisms 
between parents - affiliates. It is also likely to weaken the pressure to 
conform to the parent’s organisational practices and its operating 
norms (Bartlett and Ghoshal 1989), and facilitate the adaptation of 
host country practices (Zaheer 1995, Rosenzeig and Noharia 1994).  
At the same time, however, greater autonomy of affiliates would 
facilitate their access to the host country assets, enabling them to base 
their advantages on these assets to a greater degree. Autonomous 
affiliates are more likely to develop intense local linkages and to rely 
to a greater degree on local resources (Rosenzweig and Noharia 
1994). Formally:                                                                                                        
H5a: Greater autonomy to affiliates strengthens the LOF by 
eliminating the transfer of the firm-specific advantages.  
H5b: Greater autonomy to affiliates weakens the LOF by 
facilitating access to the host country resources. 
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Figure 2 summarises the theoretical framework and presents the 
expected direction of causality between the various components of 
competitive advantages, the variables identified to moderate their 
strength and the LOF.  
 
Operation of the Constructs   
 
The Appendix presents the measures used to operationalise the three 
types of advantages, the rationale for their choices and their operation 
measures. It also presents the operation measures of the moderating 
variables. These measures are not likely to represent all possible 
advantages that a foreign or British-owned firm may possess that is 
important in explaining the differences between them. By including 
the major sources of advantages in this sector, however, I believe that 
this problem is minimised. 
 
The variables summarised in the Appendix combine advantages at the 
level of the affiliates alone and the MNE as a whole. The firm-
specific advantages referred to are advantages of the MNE as a whole, 
which are transferred to the affiliates, and are shared by the entire 
MNE. The advantages of multinationality are only meaningful with 
reference to the MNE as a whole. In contrast, the home-based 
advantages refer to advantages that affiliates develop locally, on their 
own. The moderating variables largely belong to this category. These 
two levels of reference correspond to the LOF experienced by 
affiliates and the compensating mechanisms transferred to them by 
their parents.  
 
I create a single measure for each of the three advantages by 
combining the standardised values (based on the mean and standard 
deviation of all firms in the sample) of the multiple operations used to 
measure them
4. This is a commonly used procedure to operationalise 
multidimensional constructs, whose dimensions consist of measures 
of different scales (e.g. Law, Wong and Mobley 1998). There are a 
number of theoretical and technical reasons for favouring the use of 
such compound measures over the individual dimensions that 
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comprise them. From a theoretical point of view, the hypotheses are 
formulated at the level of the overall advantages, explicitly referring 
to the three types of advantages, not to their individual dimensions. 
Technically, the use of compound variables reduces the number of 
explanatory variables and eases the interpretation of the findings, 
notably in the presence of the moderating variables. Furthermore, the 
individual dimensions are often highly correlated. While this poses a 
considerable difficulty if analysed individually, it is not a problem if 
they are grouped into a single variable.  
 
There are a number of ways to combine different dimensions into a 
compound variable. The choice between them has critical 
implications for the findings, as it specifies the relationships between 
the overall construct and its dimensions (Law, Wong and Mobley 
1998). The compound variables here are formed as an algebraic 
combination of their dimensions. Several other specifications were 
experimented but were found less adequate, in the sense that they 
yielded lower goodness-of-fit in the analysis. Law Wong and Mobley 
(1998) suggest assuming an identical weight for the different 
dimensions when the theories concerning the constructs provide no 
firm basis to assign varying weights. They further suggest assuming 
that given a lack of theoretical specification regarding the exact 
algebraic relation between the multidimensional construct and its 
dimensions, linear relationships should be assumed. Both suggestions 
are adopted here.  
 
The control variables are hypothesised to affect the LOF via their 
impact on the three types of advantages, that is, the interest is not in 
their individual effect but in their moderating effect on the 
relationships between the advantages and the dependent variable. To 
test for these effects I create interaction variables, by multiplying the 
advantages concerned and the relevant control variables hypothesised 
to affect them. A significant sign of the interaction variables would 
imply that the link between the dependent variable and the advantage 
in question varies as a function of the value of the control variables 
(Schoonhoven 1981, Aiken and West 1991). 




Table 1 presents descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients of 
the compound variables of the three advantages and the moderating 
variables
5. Most coefficients are low (well under 0.5), enabling one 




The hypotheses were tested on a sample of financial service firms 
operating in the City of London. For the purpose of this study the City 
of London was defined as the geographic area corresponding to the 
EC postal code area of Central London (also known as the ‘Square 
Mile’). This definition enables me to exclude from the research 
financial service firms whose activity is mostly domestic (notably 
retail business), who tend to be spread across Greater London. The 
issues addressed here are of limited interest with reference to retail 
business. The latter is overwhelmingly dominated by local firms, 
handling the domestic activity of domestic clients. In this market 
domestic firms have unrivalled position, resulting from their well-
established branch networks and long relationships with clients. It is 
very difficult for foreign banks to penetrate this market, as for the 
bulk of financial services they have no advantage here (Tschoegl 
1987). The retail market is thus an inadequate context for a 
comparison between foreign- and domestically-owned firms.   
 
Data for the analysis were drawn from a variety of secondary sources. 
Financial data were taken from the Fame DVD data-base, which 
provides detailed financial and accounting information regarding 1.8 
million public and private UK firms registered in the UK, based on 
information gathered from Company Houses. Information on entry 
mode, ownership and ownership changes was gathered from The 
Bankers’ Almanac; Major Financial Institutions in the World; 
Britain’s Top Foreign Owned Companies. Information on the use of 
local currency was taken from The Bankers’ Almanac World Ranking 
and on local linkages from Crawford’s Directory of City Connections. 
Data related to the use of expatriates were taken from the ESRC study 
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‘Expatriate staffing in international financial centres’, London 1998. 
Additional data were taken from unpublished documents of the 
Corporation of London. 
 
The Fame DVD database lists 1,255 financial service firms as having 
their operating offices in the City of London, and their main business 
activity corresponding to the following 1992 UK SIC codes: 65 
(financial intermediation, except insurance and funding companies); 
66 (insurance and pension funding); and 67 (activities auxiliaries to 
financial intermediation). 487 of these firms are foreign-owned
6, that 
is, their registered headquarters are located outside Britain. 191 firms 
were excluded from this list because 30% or more of the data needed 
for the analyses were missing, leaving a sample of 296 firms. t-tests 
found no significant differences between the excluded firms and those 
included in the study in terms of number of employees and total assets 
(p<0.01 and p<0.05 respectively). About 54% of the sample firms are 
classified under SIC 6523 (other financial intermediation n.e.c.) as 
their main area of activity. Another 18% and 15% are classified as 
SIC 6601 (life insurance) and SIC 6603 (non-life insurance) 
respectively. The remaining firms are distributed quite evenly 
between the other financial service industries (4-digits SIC). The 
differences in sample size across the various financial service 
industries mirror the relative magnitude of activity in the different 
industries.  
 
In order to test the hypotheses, a model was constructed, using the 
performance of foreign firms relative to British firms as the dependent 
variable, and the set of advantages identified above as the independent 
variables. The model is of the general form:  
 Pf/[ Pb/b] = (Aff; Amf; Acf; (Aff x Cf); (Amf x Cf); (Acf x Cf)) + Ef 
                                              b 
Where:  
P – Performance 
Af – Firm-specific advantages  
Am – Multinationality advantages 
Ac – Home-based advantages 
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C – Control variables 
E - Random error term;  
b - British-owned firms (b=1…m) 
f – Foreign-owned firms (f=1….n) 
 
In contrasting the dependent variable I follow Zaheer (1995) and take 
the performance of a foreign firm in relation to the average 
performance of British-owned firms in its 4-digits industry in the City 
as an indication of the foreign firm’s LOF. Return on capital was 
selected as a proxy for performance because it is a most commonly 
used performance indicator in financial service industries (e.g. Barber 
and Lyon 1996).  
 
Independent sample t-tests on the remaining missing observations 
suggested that the missing value patterns were not random, and they 
were estimated based on existing observations. The model resulting 
from an estimation based on all observations for which the dataset 
was complete was used to estimate missing values. This analysis was 




Moderated multiple linear regression, a commonly used method to 
test hypotheses that predict interaction effects between variables (e.g. 
Schilling and Steensma 2002, Hox 1994) is used for estimating the 
model (Table 2). As is common in this procedure, the analyses start 
by estimating the model with the main effects only (Model 1). The 
moderating variables are then added on their own (Model 2), and at 
the final stage the interaction variables are included (Model 3). The 
moderating variables were hypothesised to affect the dependent 
variable only in interaction, that is, no individual effect was 
hypothesised, but the interpretation of the interaction effects requires 
that the corresponding variables are included in the model on their 
own (Hox 1994). 
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Although the correlation coefficients between the explanatory 
variables were relatively small in most cases (see Table 1), it does not 
ensure a lack of multicollinearity between the independent variables 
(Hair et al 1995). Hence, the variance inflation factor (VIF), which 
tells about the degree to which each independent variable is explained 
by the other independent variables, was also calculated. All variables 
are below the suggested cut-off point of 10 (Studenmund 1992).  
 
The data presented in Table 2 provide strong support for the need to 
distinguish between different types of advantages when analysing the 
LOF. The different advantages vary considerably in terms of their 
explanatory power for the relative performance of foreign and British 
firms. When analysed in this way it becomes apparent that the lack of 
the LOF in the City is not a paradox with existing theory, but rather 
signifies a need to extend and develop more refined tools to deal with 
it (Poole and Van de Ven 1989).  
 
Hypotheses H1a and H1b, referring to the firm-specific and 
multinationality advantages respectively, are strongly supported. Both 
variables are highly significant and in the direction hypothesised in 
the three models. Furthermore, the regression coefficients of these 
variables are stable between the three models. The inclusion of the 
interaction variables does not change significantly the sign and 
significance of these variables. The somewhat weaker explanatory 
power of the firm-specific advantages and multinationality advantages 
in models 2 and 3 is probably due to the addition of the moderating 
variables.  
 
Of the three types of advantages, the multinationality advantages are 
the most significant, a finding that seems associated with a number of 
characteristics of financial services. First, the potential for economic 
benefits from information generated internally on a global level if 
particularly large in financial services, the hence the ability to gather 
information globally is likely to be a critical source of advantage 
(Zaheer and Mosakowski 1997). Firms with operations in many 
countries can arbitrage this information through internal 
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communication channels. The larger the share of a firm’s foreign 
activities and the more diverse its linkages, the lower the cost of 
acquiring information on currencies and the management of risk. The 
better also would be its ability to meet the demand for multi-currency, 
multi-country lines of credits and for management of international 
funds (Brealey and Kaplanis 1996). An MNE with an international 
network is thus able to make a more accurate assessment of risk 
involved in lending and doing business. Second, in financial services 
there is a special advantage in the ability to trade continuously around 
the clock (Zaheer 2000). International reach enables firms to cover all 
time zones (Zaheer 2000), a condition for such activities.  
 
No support, however, is found for the anticipated impact of the home-
based advantages (H1c). This variable is not significant in the three 
models, implying that the home-based advantages do not provide 
British-owned firms with a competitive edge over foreign firms. This 
was the only type of advantages in which British firms were 
hypothesised to outperform foreign firms, that is, the only source of 
potential LOF. As these advantages are less important, there is no 
reason to expect LOF. In support of hypothesis H1d, the lack of LOF 
in the City indeed indicates that the home-based advantages are less 
important in this context. Another possibility to explain the findings, 
which should not be ruled out, is that there are no differences between 
foreign and British firms in their use of the location advantages of 
London, and hence these possess no explanatory power for the 
differences between them. A formal test of this suggestion requires 
comparing samples of these two populations, which is not possible in 
this study design. 
 
Taken together, these findings support the suggestion that 
globalisation is eroding the impact of nationality, rendering 
differences related to nationality – on which the entire LOF argument 
lies – less important determinants of competitive position 
(McKendrick 2001, Nachum 1999). The processes of globalisation 
yield considerable value to advantages of multinationality per se, and 
appear to eliminate the value of the home-based advantages. The 
  19 
 
  
latter are location-bound, and have limited value when competition is 
taking place on a global basis (Rugman and Verbeke 1992).  
 
Only a few of the interaction variables are significant, and their 
inclusion in the model slightly improves its overall explanatory 
power. H2 is rejected in all its variations, that is, the interaction 
variables that involve duration of activity in the City are not 
significant. However, the interaction variables were constructed based 
on the assumption that the interactions are linear (Schoonhoven 1981) 
but this assumption may not hold with reference to duration of 
activity. Zaheer and Mosakowski’s (1997) analysis of the changing 
LOF over time provides a basis for assuming non-linear relationships 
between duration of activity and the LOF. To test for the possibility of 
such relationships, I add to the regression squared elements of the 
interaction variables with duration. Both squared measures are 
significant (p<.01 and p<.05 in the interactions with firm advantages 
and home advantages respectively) and the overall explanatory power 
of the model increased (Adj. R
2 = .437, F = .002). 
 
The history of foreign investment in the City may provide an 
explanation for this finding. Foreign financial service firms have been 
operating in the City since the early 19
th century, initially originating 
from Commonwealth countries, then from European countries, and 
towards the end of the 19
th century and early 20
th century from the US 
(King 1990, Coakley 1992). However, the overall magnitude of 
foreign activity in this period was quite limited - by 1914 there were 
about 30 foreign banks in the City (King 1990). It was in the decades 
following the Second World War that foreign activity increased 
considerably. The number of US banks – the dominant foreign 
investors in this period – rose from 7 in 1959 to 68 in 1968 (London 
Business School 1995). This dramatic growth by US firms was 
followed by European firms in the 1970s and Japanese firms in the 
1980s. The number of staff employed by foreign banks in the City 
rose from 38,000 in 1983 to 72,000 in 1987 (King 1990). After the 
stock market crash of 1987 there was an equally drastic reduction, and 
London was hosting declining numbers of foreign financial service 
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firms (London Business School 1995). Thus, while there is a long 
history of foreign presence, many of the foreign firms operating in the 
City today established themselves in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
This wide variation in terms of the duration of activity is confirmed 
by the standard deviation of duration in the sample (Table 1). The 
significant explanatory power of the squared expression of the 
interaction variables suggests that only the recently established firms 
experience the LOF, while older investors have long overcome these 
difficulties. This is consistent with the findings reported by Zaheer 
and Mosakowki (1997) in relation to foreign firms in New York and 
Tokyo.   
 
Cultural distance has a moderate effect on the transferability of the 
firm advantages and no effect on the ability to access the home-based 
advantages (H2a and H2b respectively). The limited explanatory 
power of the interaction variables with cultural distance for variation 
in the LOF might be attributed to the national origin of the foreign 
firms operating in the City. The majority of these firms originate from 
countries similar to Britain in terms of their locational advantages and 
structure of demand. For example, about three quarters of the foreign 
members of the British Fund Managers Association are affiliates of 
European and US-headquartered corporations (Fund Managers’ 
Association 2000). Likewise, 85% of the assets of foreign banks in 
the UK are controlled by American, Japanese and European banks 
(British Invisibles 2000). This eliminates many of the differences 
associated with the home-based advantages (Miller 2001) that 
undermine the notion of cultural distance. This is consistent with the 
previous findings regarding the limited value of the home-based 
advantages in competition in the City of London, eliminating the 
importance of any differences resulting from national origin. Another 
possible explanation, which is in support with this, might be that the 
firm-specific strength overcomes the advantages provided by the 
cultural distance between the home and host countries (Tschoegl 
2000), making the cultural distance less relevant (Shenkar 2001).  
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The most significant interaction variables are those with entry mode, 
notably the interaction with the home-based advantages. As 
hypothesised entry via M&As eases the access of foreign firms to the 
home base advantages. The negative sign of the interaction with the 
firm advantages supports the hypothesis that it also eliminates the 
transfer of the MNE advantages to the affiliates.  
 
The organisational structure by MNEs has no effect on the strength of 
the LOF, providing no support for H5. This finding might be attributed 
to the central position held by many London affiliates, who often hold 
responsibility for the entire global operation of the MNE of which they 
are part. The position of London as a centre of international activity 
often puts these affiliates in a better position to manage the 
international operations of their corporations than the headquarters. 
Many Japanese as well as other Asian firms establish operations in 
London with the explicit objective of managing their global operations 
from there (Hawawini and Schill 1994, Warner 1991, Newall 1996). 
US financial service MNEs often maintain in the US headquarters the 
responsibility for the domestic US operations, while the London office 
handles the entire global operations. Other City affiliates act as the 
regional headquarters for the European operations of the MNEs of 
which they are part (London Business School 1995). Under such 
circumstances, the London office enjoys considerable autonomy and is 
likely to be well embedded in the host environment, eliminating the 





A number of tests were conducted to validate the findings reported in 
Tables 2. The results of these tests are available upon request. First, 
the return on capital, which was used to measure performance, may 
suffer some limitations, resulting from profit shifting and transfer 
pricing by MNEs. Multinational firms tend to ‘play around’ with their 
profits, as a way to avoid taxes, and often do not declare their profits in 
the place where they were actually gained (Demirguc-Kunt and 
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Huizinga 2001). They may also use transfer pricing as a mechanisms to 
show higher profits in low tax locations. To test whether such profit 
shifting practices affect the results I estimate the model with alternative 
dependent variables. These include the tobin’s q (defined as: (equity + 
stock + debt)/assets) and stock exchange performance (return per 
share). These measures are likely to be free of the profit-shifting 
problem because income shifting is supposed to be reflected in the 
market evaluation of firms.  The results continue to hold.  
 
Second, I examine the possible impact of the national origin of foreign 
firms in the City on the findings. It has been convincingly argued that 
under certain circumstances foreignness may be an advantage, not a 
disadvantage (Kostova and Zaheer 1999, Shenkar 2001). Certain 
cultures are considered attractive to other cultures, causing individuals 
and firms to try to imitate rather than reject them. To test for a 
possible impact of such perceptions on the results, I split the sample 
into two sub samples, based on the level of economic development of 
the home country of the firms concerned vis-à-vis the UK. The level of 
development of the home vs host countries has been suggested as a 
major determinant of the perception of foreignness (Miller 2001). The 
hypotheses are confirmed for the two sub-samples, although the level 
of significance for the sample of countries at lower level of 
development than the UK is slightly lower, but this might be attributed 
to the smaller degrees of freedom.     
 
Third, I test for the sensitivity of the results to the presence of 
indigenous firms in the British population. Many of the hypotheses 
advanced here might be sensitive to the combination of multinational 
and indigenous firms in the British population, which was used as the 
dominator for the calculation of the dependent variable. To test for 
potential bias that might be introduced by this, I exclude all purely 
indigenous firms, and calculate the dependent variable based on the 
performance of British MNEs only. The results continue to hold.  
 
Fourth, I test the robustness of the estimation results after eliminating 
outliers (McClelland 2000) on the dependent variable. The presence 
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of ‘abnormal performance’ was recently acknowledged as a potential 
bias of research that relies on performance measures (Barber and 
Lyon 1996). The hypotheses are confirmed at similar significance 




This research has sought to extend the theory of the LOF by studying 
the financial service sector in the City of London, whereby the 
superior competitive position of foreign firms relative to this of local 
ones does not conform to the prediction of existing theory. In order to 
understand this departure from theory, and its implications beyond the 
specific setting of the City of London, a close look was undertaken at 
the causes of the LOF. A theoretical framework was introduced, 
which distinguishes between different types of advantages that 
determine the relative performance of MNEs vis-à-vis domestic firms 
and hence the degree of the LOF. Rather than taking the existence of 
the LOF as given, and searching for the firm and environmental 
characteristics that affect its strength and persistence (e.g. Miller and 
Prakhe 2002, Mezias 2002), I put the mere existence of the LOF at the 
centre of the analysis. I am thus able to identify the variation that 
arises from the nature of the advantages and the underlying 
characteristics determining the LOF itself.  
 
The theoretical framework advanced here enables one to understand 
what are the sources of the superior competitive position of foreign 
firms in the City: do they arise from the superior firm-specific 
advantages of MNEs, who may compensate for foreign firms’ 
disadvantages; or else that nationality does not affect the ability of 
firms to access host country resources, that is, the home-based 
advantages are of limited importance. The findings show that when 
examined in this way, the non-existence of the LOF in the City of 
London is not inconsistent with existing theory, but rather signifies a 
need to expand its scope and take a more refined look at its causes 
(Poole and Van de Ven 1989).  
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This theoretical framework was also shown to have a considerable 
merit when used to analyse a number of moderating variables, which 
were proposed in the LOF literature as affecting the strength and 
persistence of the LOF. It enabled me to examine the multi-
dimensional impact of these variables, and to show their impact on 
different types of advantages, often in different directions. These 
moderating variables were shown to influence only particular aspects 
of the LOF and have only limited or no impact on others. However, 
most of the moderating variables tested here were insignificant, 
excluding most of these explanations for the lack of the LOF in the 
City of London.  
 
The findings of the study have important implications for managers of 
MNEs. They imply that the LOF does not apply to all foreign activity 
a firm may undertake, but rather is likely to vary in line with the type 
of advantages an MNE possesses and those that are important in 
competition in different settings. Foreign expansion may thus not 
always be associated with additional costs to those incurred within 
their home country. The need for compensating mechanisms to 
overcome the LOF in order to compete successfully, which has been 
emphasised in the literature (e.g. Zaheer 1995, Mezias 2002), may not 
be an obstacle to all foreign operations. Rather, there is a need for a 
careful evaluation of the specific context of foreign expansion, and an 
assessment of the extent to which the LOF is likely to be experienced 
there.  
 
Another important lesson to managers is that the LOF is not a unified 
concept but rather has a number of components, with considerable 
variation across them in terms of a firm’s ability to influence them by 
way of strategic manipulation. The implicit assumption in most 
discussions of the LOF is that they are determined by forces external 
to firms, on which firms have no control (see Miller and Prakhe 2002 
for a representative approach). In contrast, underlying the approach 
taken here is the implicit assumption that firms can partly manipulate 
the strength and persistence of the LOF. The home-based advantages 
of local firms are advantages on which firms exercise no individual 
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control, but the firm-specific advantages and the advantages of 
multinationality are subject to the strategic manevoure of firms, and 
can be manipulated to lessen the impact of the LOF.  
 
An important task for future research, which emerges from this study, 
is to examine the validity of the findings reported here in different 
contexts. There is a need to establish the extent to which these 
findings are unique to financial services in the City of London, or else 
characterise certain specific geographic and/or industrial settings. If 
the latter, another important task for future research would be to 
identify these settings.  
 
The most immediate candidates for such generalisations are other 
global financial centres. The literature on global financial centres 
introduces a hierarchy of centres whereby London, New York and 
Tokyo are recognised to form the top (Roberts 1994, Sassen 1991). 
Their common characteristics, which set them apart from other 
financial centres, are their centrality and the global reach of their 
financial ties. Yet, these financial centres differ in a number of 
important aspects that may impede generalisations even to these 
seemingly similar contexts. First, the shares of activity controlled by 
foreign ownership are higher in London than in Tokyo and New York. 
For example, the number of foreign banks in London is 537 compared 
with 275 and 93 in New York and Tokyo respectively (Corporation of 
London 2000). It is likely that in the presence of other foreign firms, 
the liability of being foreign is weaker (Zaheer and Mosakowski 
1997). Second, and related to the first, London handles more 
international activity than New York and Tokyo. While London 
specialises in international activity, New York and Tokyo have built 
their strength upon their domestic economies (Morgan 1997), and 
they are dominated by domestically headquartered firms (Tschoegl 
1988). The third characteristic that appears to distinguish London 
from Tokyo and New York is the policy attitude towards foreign 
ownership. British policies have been more liberal than those of 
American and certainly Japanese governments (Tschoegl 1988), and 
for the most part, have made no distinctions by nationality in their 
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policies (Morgan 1997). This has eliminated many of the forces 
creating the LOF in London.  
 
A second direction, which is closely related to the first, is to test the 
possible generalisation of the findings to global cities in general. 
Global cities are distinguished from other locations by their high 
levels of global links, hosting high proportions of foreign firms and 
individuals. Their dynamics are driven by the global economy rather 
than by local or national economies, and they tend to be linked with 
each other more than with the national economies that host them 
(Sassen 1991, 1999). It might be that this specific context gives rise to 
different sources of advantages and affects differently the existence 
and strength of the LOF. The notions of the home-based advantages 
and differences associated with nationality – on which the LOF lies – 
may not hold in this context. Likewise, the additional costs incurred 
from running global networks may not be a liability because having 
such networks is a condition of operating in this context and hence 
these costs are incurred to all participants (Sassen 1999).  
 
Finally, there is also a need to examine the possible generalisation of 
the findings reported here to other sectors and industries. Most 
analysis of the LOF thus far, including the present one, have focused 
on financial services. These services exhibit a unique configuration of 
local linkages and nationality influences that may impede 
generalisations to other sectors and industries. In some respects, 
notably the ease with which financial information is transferred over 
distance, they are subject to a greater degree than other sectors to the 
influences of the forces of globalisation, which eliminate differences 
associated with national origin (O’Brian 1992, Darlington 1998). 
Furthermore, competitive position in many financial services is 
determined on a global level, reflecting the ability of firms to meet 
certain conditions of entry and price, which are set on a global scale 
(Sassen 1999, Morgan 1997). At the same time, however, certain 
advantages and disadvantages of financial service firms seem to be 
closely associated with national origin, and are difficult, if not at all 
impossible, to replicate by foreign firms. Studies have repeatedly 
  27 
 
  
shown that the growth of financial service firms is closely related to 
the growth of the economy of their home countries (Benston 1990, 
Hawawini and Schill 1994), and that firms often have an advantage in 
deals involving their home country currency (Smith 1992, Brealey 
and Kaplanis 1996). Furthermore, financial services are a major target 
of national government regulations, acting to stress national 
differences (Steinherr and Huveneers 1994), making a firm’s home-
base a vital determinant of its competitive position.  
 
The relative importance of the different types of advantages identified 
here to determine the LOF is likely to vary across locations and 
industries, providing a useful framework for testing the validity of the 
findings to different contexts. For example, when an industry is 
subject to a considerable amount of international competition, and 
international competition is taking place on a global (rather than 
multi-domestic) level, the advantages of multinationality are likely to 
be the most important, and the LOF less significant. Under such 
circumstances firms derive advantages from the international scope of 
their activities through learning and access to resources, and this 
eliminates the value of the home-based advantages. By contrast, in 
industrial and/or geographic contexts in which the home-based 
advantages are particularly valuable the LOF is likely to be most 
significant.  





1   This data underestimates the number of British firms that went 
out of business, because for the most part they have been targets 
for take-over by foreign firms (London Economics 1995). 
 
2   London’s performance in terms of market shares is taken as an 
overall indication of its location advantages. Actual performance 
is often used as a proxy for the existence (or otherwise) of 
location advantages (e.g., Nachum 1999).   
 
3   It might also be that British-owned firms do not take advantage 
of their better ability to access the home-based advantages, and 
hence these do not support their competitive position. Since the 
focus here is on foreign firms, and British firms are only used 
for comparison, this cannot be tested. 
 
4    I prefer this method over the alternative of factor analysis, 
whereby the factor scores summarise the information contained 
in individual variables, because I wish to impose a certain 
structure on the compound variables. The procedure chosen is 
more adequate for this purpose.   
 
5    Descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients of the 
individual dimensions that constitute the compound variables 
are available upon request.  
 
6   The database covers only firms registered in Britain as Limited 
Companies. It thus underestimates the total number of foreign-
owned firms in the City, since foreign affiliates operating in 
Britain under different arrangements are not covered.  
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TABLE 1. THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES INCLUDED IN THE 
MODEL, THEIR OPERATION MEASURES, DESCRIPTIVE 
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(M&As; 
greenfield) 






.2245  .2083         1.000 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
aSee text for explanation 
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TABLE 2: A MODEL LINKING COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGES, 
MODERATING VARIABLES AND THE LOF 
 













2.381 ** 1.019 .261  2.359 
** 







1.023 .238 2.983 
** 







.207 1.004 -8.372 -.672  1.008 -.340  -1.127 1.441
Moderating variables 
Duration -  -  -  8.143  .861  1.367  6.765  .733  1.415
Cultural distance  -  -  -  2.478  .229  1.486  3.857  .365  1.540
Entry mode  -  -  -  .516  1.636* 1.540  .459  1.508+ 1.557
Organisational 
structure 
- -  -  6.443  .127  1.319  8.045  .160  1.408
Interaction variables 
FA * Duration 
activity 
- -  -  - -  -  2.023  1.296  1.909
FA * Cultural 
distance 
- -  -  - -  -  3.895  1.950+ 7.916
FA * Entry mode  -  -  -  -  -  -  -.729  - 
2.381**
6.556
FA * Organisational 
structure 
- -  -  - -  -  .219  .358  1.486
HA * Duration 
activity 
- -  -  - -  -  2.461  1.329  5.820
HA * Cultural 
distance 
- -  -  - -  -  1.220  .991  8.106
HA * Entry mode  -  -  -  -  -  -  2.886  2.125** 1.515
HA * Organisational 
structure 
- -  -  - -  -  -.274  -.602  1.635
Adj. R
2 .375  .398  .469 
Sig. F  .004  .003  .001 
N 296 
 
*** p<.001; ** p<.01; * p<.05; + p<.10 
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The Competitive position of British-owned firms in world markets
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FIGURE 2. ADVANTAGES DETERMINING THE STRENGTH OF THE 
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APPENDIX. OPERATIONS OF THE CONSTRUCTS 
 
Firm-specific advantages 
1. Intangible assets. The possession of certain intangible assets, such as good 
will, innovative capabilities, trademarks, publication rights, brand names, is 
conceptualised in the international business literature as a necessary attribute of 
MNEs (Caves 1996. See also Delios and Beamish 2001). The possession of such 
assets is operationalised here by the value of a firm’s intangible assets 
(expressed as share of total assets). 
 
2. Financial strength. Solid financial base is a critical advantage for firms 
dealing with the finance of risk, as it provides them with a better ability to meet 
their financial obligations. It signals financial security and thus makes firms 
more attractive to clients (Hirtle 1991). Two indicators of financial strength are 
used here: 1. Liquidity ratio: the ratio between current assets and current 
liabilities; and 2. Credit rating. This provides an indication of financial stability 
and capacity of a company, and are often used as the ultimate indication of 
creditworthiness.  
 
3. Size. Large size is an advantage in the gathering and processing of 
information, as it reduces the unit cost of acquiring information (Brealey and 
Kaplanis 1996, Hirtle 1991). Larger financial service firms can attract large 
clients and handle the management of large portfolios of financial instruments, 
and those tend to be more profitable (Steinherr and Huveneers 1994). The wave 
of mergers and consolidation that have swept the financial services sector in the 
last decade, and the sheer volumes involved in these deals (The Banker 1998) 
suggest that size does convey considerable advantages. Total assets is a most 
commonly used measure of size in financial services (e.g., Barber and Lyon 1996) 
and it is used here.  
 
4. Managerial skills. As the services provided by financial service firms are 
becoming increasingly similar (largely a result of technological advances), the 
effective management of resources, which allow firms to compete on price, is 
becoming an important source of differentiation. Furthermore, in the past, firms 
in many financial service industries were operating in non-competitive 
environments, protected by regulation. With increased competition, managerial 
skills, directed towards the efficient utilisation of resources, have become 
critical. Finally, the increased size and sophistication of the activities of many 
financial service firms, in terms of both their geographic and product coverage, 
put high demands on managers and require specific managerial skills. Directors’ 
remuneration (as share of total remuneration) is used to operationalise 
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management skills. Pay levels for directors in the City of London have risen 
considerably, and although there is a debate whether these indeed pay off 
(Financial Times 2000), the willingness of firms to pay their directors so 
handsomely suggests that they see a link between these compensations and the 
performance of managers.  
 
Advantages of multinationality  
1. Intensity of international activity. The intensity of activity is taken as a 
proxy for the possession of advantages of multinationality (Dunning 1993). The 
number of foreign offices a firm controls is used as an indicator of the intensity 
of international activity. The more commonly used measure – share of foreign 
sales (Sullivan 1994) – is only available for a small number of observations in 
the sample. However, the correlation coefficient between the two measures for 
the small number of observations for which both measures are available is very 
high (.91, p<0.01), enabling one to accept the number of foreign offices as an 
adequate measure.    
  
2. Internal linkages. The access of affiliates to the stock of information and 
commercial knowledge possessed by the network of the organisation of which 
they are part provides them with considerable advantage over indigenous firms, 
who are deprived of such sources of information ((Zaheer and Mosakowski 
1997). The extent to which affiliates benefit from advantages of multinationality 
in the form of access to information of the network depends on the intensity of 
their linkages with the parent company and the rest of the MNE of which they 
are part. Share of profits transferred by the affiliates to the parents is taken as a 
proxy for the intensity of the linkages between them. Internal transactions, 
measured by financial (Korbin 1991, Nohira and Ghoshal 1997) or information 
(Mezias 2002) transfers, are often used as indicators of the strength of the 
relationships between affiliates and headquarters. This is measured here by a 
dummy variable that gets four values indicating different levels of profits 
transfer as shares of total profits earned. 
 
Home-based advantages 
1. Access to local information. Zaheer and Mosakowski (1997) have 
convincingly argued that in financial services, the main type of advantages that 
national firms enjoy over foreign firms are those related to the local information 
flows provided by local customers, other firms in the industry and national 
central banks. Foreign firms are likely to be in a considerable disadvantage vis-
à-vis local ones in this respect, arising from them not being sufficiently 
embedded in the information networks in the country of location (Shukla and 
Ainwegen 1995). The number of local links a firm establishes with other firms 
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in the City (including insurance, stockbrokers, financial advisers, auditors, 
solicitors, major shareholders) is taken as an indication of its access to local 
information. 
 
2. Preference of local customers. An important source of the LOF, which was 
highlighted already by Hymer (1960) and in many discussions ever since, lies in 
the preference of local customers for domestic firms, with whom they have long 
established relationships and who are usually perceived to have more stable and 
reliable links to their home country. A direct measure of the preference of local 
customers is not available and I use the share of activity in British pounds in 
total activity to capture this potential source of advantage of British firms. Local 
customers are likely to have greater shares of their transactions undertaken in 
their home currency than foreign customers, thus providing a reasonable proxy 
for the share of local customers serviced by firms.  
 
3. Reliance on local resources. Local firms are likely to have easier and more 
favoured access to their home country resources, such as local suppliers and 
labour. Hymer was explicit in suggesting this as a major reason of the LOF 
(Hymer 1960). While later discussions have acknowledged that this advantage 
may not apply in all circumstances, it appears to be an important source of 
advantage of local firms in the City of London. The characteristic attitude in the 
City emphasises the ‘old boys network’ for purposes of recruitments and 
external linkages of any kind (McDowell 1997, Thrift 1994). This has given 
British-owned firms a considerable advantage over foreign firms in accessing 
local resources, notably local labour. London resources are regarded as world 
class (London Business School 1995), and favourable access to them can 
certainly provide a considerable source of advantage. Share of expatriates 
among total senior managers and professionals is used to measure the reliance 
of firms on local labour. This is measured by a dummy variable that 
distinguishes between four levels, based on the proportion of expatriates among 
the active directors and chief executives (less than 10%, 11-20%, 21-30% 
30%+). Reference is made only to senior positions because the dominant 
tendency among MNEs is to rely on local labour for all their lower skilled 
employment. Similar measures of other local resources are not available, but 
with labour being by far the most critical resource of financial service firms, the 
omission of other resources is unlikely to bias the findings. 
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Duration of foreign operation  
Is operationalised by years since the establishment of the London office. 
 
Cultural distance between the host and home countries 
Following Kogut and Singh (1988) I calculate a composite index, based on 
Hofstede’s indices (Hofstede 2001). The index is based on the deviation along 
each of the four cultural dimensions (power distance, uncertainty avoidance, 
masculinity and individualism) of each country from the UK. I correct for 
differences in the variances of each dimension and then calculate the arithmetic 
average between the four dimensions.  
 
Entry mode 
Dummy variable that gets the value 1 for entry via M&As; 0 for greenfield.  
 
Organisational structure.  
A number of studies have used the layers of reporting within the organisation as 
an indication of the organisational structure of MNEs (Zaheer and Mosakowski 
1997, Mezias 2002). I adopt a similar approach and operationalise 
organisational structure by a dummy variable that gets the value 1 if the affiliate 
reports directly to the headquarters, 0 otherwise.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 